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We use data from Guatemala and Honduras to investigate some implications of the
Purchasing Power Parity theory over the long run. In particular, we address two questions. First,
to what extent did the fixed exchange rate regime impose macroeconomic discipline on these
countries. Second, what was the impact of terms of trade shocks and growth differentials on
inflation rate differentials between those countries and the United States. We found that the fixed
parities regime worked properly until the mid-1970s, providing some constraint on central bank
behavior. However, the evidence suggests that the fixed exchange rate system was not sufficient
to avoid inflation outbursts and balance of payments crises. Specifically, it was unable to
accommodate large negative terms of trade shocks in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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I.Introduction
Gustav Cassel's formulation of the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine in
1916 was followed by decades of controversy.' This debate became particularly
heated in the 1950s and early 1960s, when a number of analysts used PPP calculations
to evaluate whether specific currencies were overvalued or undervalued Houth21ckIr,
1962). By explicitly introducing nonttadable goods and technological progress into the
analysis, Bela Balassa's (1964) reinterpretation of PPP helped place things in
perspective. He convincingly argued that in the presence of differentials in
technological progress across counties and sectors, PPP computations would tend to
differ systematically from the equilibrium (real) exchange rate. Balassa showed that
under a plausible set of assumptions —namelythat technological progress is faster in
tradables than in nontradables, and that technological progress is the main source of
growth —,therate of inflation in the faster growing country would be, in equilibrium,
higher than that of the slower grower.2 This interpretation of inflation differentials
continues to be popular among international economists. For instance, Marston (1987)
has relied on it to explain Japan's real exchange rate behavior vis-a-vis the U.S., and
Svensson (1993) has mentioned it as a possible explanation for the collapse of the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1993.
Many recent policy analyses of open economies have been strongly influenced
by Balassa's broad work on exchange rates and economic reform. For instance, much
of the work on the effect of terms of trade shocks on real exchange rate behavior has
built on Balassa's contributions in the 1960s.' Also, discussions on the merits of
alternative exchange rate regimes in developing and Eastern European countries have
been influenced by Balassa's work on policy reform. This has been particularly the
case in policy debates on the desirability of using fixed nominal exchange rates as2
anchors in stabilization programs (see Balassa 1987 and 1989; see aiso Corden 199].
and Edwards 1993).
In this paper we use data from two Central American countries —Guatemala
and Honduras —toinvestigate some PPP-related issues close to Balassa's early work.
These two nations had fixed exchange rate regimes for nearly seven decades, and
provide a unique opportunity for testing some of the most important implications of
PPP over the (very) long run. The Hondurancurrency was uninterruptedly pegged to
the dollar between 1918 and 1990; Guatemala'scurrency was fixed to the dollar
between 1926 and 1986 (see the Appendix for details). Weare particularly interested in
addressing two questions: first, to what extent the reliance on fixed exchange rates for
such a long period imposed macroeconomic discipline to thesecountries. That is, to
what extent inflation in these countries was determinedby "world" inflation. We deal
with this issue primarily from the point of view of moderncredibility theories that
emphasized the role of institutional constraints as an effectiveway of tieing the hands
of opportunistic governments. Second, we investigate theway in which terms of trade
changes and growth differentials affected inflation rates differentials between each of
these countries and the United States. We found that in bothcountries the fixed
exchange regime worked relatively well until the mid-1970s. In ct, the evidence
provides some support to the view that fixed exchange rates acted forlong periods of
time as a constraint on Central Bank behavior.However, the analysis also shows that
the mere existence of a fixed exchange ratewas not a sufficient condition for avoiding
inflation outbursts and balance ofpayments crises. More specifically, the evidence
suggests that having maintained a fixed exchange rate during a period oflarge negative
terms of trade shocks in the late 1970s andearly 1980s may have had negative effects
on these countries.3
Thepaper is organized as follows. Section U deals with PPP tests. We first
use annual data for 1930-1983 to perform standard tests of the relative version of PPP
holds in Guatemala and Honduras. We then use modern time series techniques on
quarterly data for 1957-1983 to further investigate this issue. We find that when these
more powerful tests are applied it is possible to reject the relative version of PPP for
both Central American nations. Section III tries to account for the factors affecting
departures from PPP. In particuiar, we consider the potential roles of both monetary
and real factors. We test whether these countries exercised independent monetary
and/or credit policies during this period. Regarding real shocks, we investigate
whether terms of trade disturbances and growth differentials affected inflation rate
differentials. Section P/ deals with these countries' exchange rate crises during the
late 1980s and early 1990s.Weargue that after the oil shocks and the debt crisis both
of these countries experienced significant changes in their credit and fiscal policies.
The appendix provides a brief history of Guatemala and Honduras' experiences with
fixed exchange rates.
II. Fixed Excban2e Rates and PPP In Central America: A Long Run Empirical
Perspective
Even though Honduras had a fixed exchange rate from 1918 to 1990 and
Guatemala between 1926 and 1986, we have only been able to find macroeconomic
data for both countries from the 1930s. Figure 1 displays annual rates of inftation for
1930-1992 for Guatemala, Honduras and the U.S.' This figure suggests that it is
possible to distinguish three broad subperiods. The first goes from 1930 to
approximately 1955 and is characterized by rates of inflation in the two Central































































































subperiod was characterized by dramatic economic turbulence, including the Great
Depression, the Second World War, and the Korean War. The second subperiod goes
from approximately 1956 to 1983, and is characterized by low and relatively stable
rates of inflation. As can be seen from Table 1, during this era the average rate of
inflation was lower in both Central American countries than in the U.S. Interestingly
enough, this period was not free of external disturbances, as the world endured two
major oil shocks and in 1982 the eruption of the debt crisis. Finally, the third period
goes from 1984 through 1992 and is characterized by the development of major
imbalances that ended, in both Guatemala (1986) and Honduras (1990), with the
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime. An important characteristic of this
subperiod is that the authorities in both countries responded to the debt crisis by
following a domestic credit policy that was clearly at odds with the countries' history,
and that eventually proved to be inconsistent with maintaining a pegged exchange rate.
In this section we use both yearly and quarterly data to test whether inflation in
our two Central American countries deviated significantly from that of the U.S.. We
first estimate traditional partial adjustmenttype equations on annual data. We then use
time series techniques on quarterly data to gain further insights on the behavior of
inflation differentials.
11.1 Testing for the Relative Version of PPP Using Annual Data
In its simplest form, what Balassa (1964) called the relativeversionof PPP,
states that under fixed exchange rates inflation rates across countries will not differ
significantly. However, as pointed out by Bala.ssa (1964) and previously by Cassel
(1916), in the short run it is still possible for domestic inflation to deviate from




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relative version of PPP holds is by postulating a partial adjustnient equation of the
following type (Frenkel, 1978):
Inf(t)a0 + a1 InfUS(t) + a2 Inf(t-1) + u(t), (1)
where Inf(t) is inflation in the country in question in period t, InflJS is foreign
inflation, which in our case is inflation in the US, and u(t) is an error term assumed to
have the usualproperties.SIf PPP holds in the long run, a/(1-a2) should not be
significantly different from one. Naturally, in this formulation coefficient a2 measures
the speed at which deviations from PPP are eliminated.
Table 2 presents the results obtained from the estimation of equation (1) using
annual data from Guatemala and Honduras for two subperiods: 1930 (or the first year
for which there are data) and 1982, and 1956 through 1982. As can be seen from
Table 2, the relative version of PPP is rejected for the period that goes from the 1930s
to 1983. The Chi-square statistic for testing whether the long-run coefficient of U.S.
inflation is unity is 4.9 for Guatemala and 5.4 for Honduras. However, it is not
possible to reject it, in either country, for the more tranquil period 1957-83: In this
case the long run coefficient of U.S. inflation is not significantly different from one
(the Chi-square statistic is 1.9 for Guatemala and 0.18 for Honduras).
Traditional tests of PPP of the type reported above are subject to some
limitations, including the use of annual data and the assumption that inflation rates are
stationary. Additionally, the test on coefficient restrictions used to investigate whether
the coefficient of InfUS is unity in the long run has a relative low power. As a way to
deal with these issues we have used quarterly data for 1957-83 to further investigate
the behavior of inflation rates under fixed parities in these countries.TABLE 2
LONGRUN RELATIVE VERSIONOFPPP (a)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
GUATEMALA HONDURAS
PERIOD 1939-83 1957-83 1931-83 1957-83
Constant 1.443 -1.543 1 207 -0.581
(1.157) (-1.334) (1.826) (-0.721)
lnf US 0.319 0.947 0.337 0.855
(1.297) (3.173) (2.566) (4.716)
mt (t-1) 0.502 0.293 0.411 0.266
(3.861) (1.601) (3.325) (1.996)
R2 0.405 0.708 0.447 0.754
DW 1.930 1.620 1.990 1.940
Durbin's h 0.480 3.192 0.083 0.216
(a) Yeaily data The first observation corresponds to the firstyear for which there
is information.6
11.2Analysis withQuarterlyData:1957-1983
Accordingto the relative version of PPP and to the simplest monetary theories
of the international transmission of inflation, under a fixed nominal exchange rate
system the rate of domestic inflation in a small open economy does not differ from
"the" world rate of inftation (Swoboda, 1978). Under this setting, international price
disturbances will be rapidly and fully transmitted into the domestic economy.
Moreover, local central banks would have no room for engaging in monetary policy: a
domestic excess supply (demand) for money will result in an equiproportional loss
(gain) of international reserves, leaving the quantity of money and domestic prices
unchanged in the domestic economy. If this simple model of the international
transmission of inflation holds, we would expect that the time series of inflationary
differentials between the domestic country and "the" world will be characterized by
white noise.
Table 3 contains Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests, and Ljung-
Box statistics for white noise series. In every case inflation differentials were defined
as follows:
Dinf =i- (2)
where iandiarequarterly inflation rates for the country in question and the
U.S. As in the previous section, inflation is defined as the percentage change in the
consumer price index. As can be seen from Table ,inboth cases the hypothesis that
the inflationary differential has a unit root is rejected at conventional levels. The
Ljung-Box Qstatisticsreported in the second column show, on the other hand, that the
hypothesis that inflationary differentials is white noise cannot be rejected at the 1 %
level in the case of Guatemala.6Table 3
AUGMENTEDDICKEY-FULLER AND LJUNG-BOX
TESTS OF INFLATIONARY DIFFERENCES
Time Series: Dlrif(t) = lrif(1,t) - tnf(US,t)
Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (a) Ljung-Box 0 (b)
GUATEMALA
57.2- 78.4 -3.6 6.6




(a) Computed wIth 4 lags. The critical value of the ADF statistic at the 5 percent level is -2.9.
(b) The critical values of the Q statistic with 8 degrees of freedom at 10 percent and 5percent
levels are 13.4 and 15.5 respectively.7
The analysis of the time series properties of Dinf reported in Table 3
contradicts that obtained from the simple partial adjustment model on annual data, and
provides preliminary evidence suggesting that at least in the short run, variables other
than world inflation affected domestic inflationary dynamics. From a policy
perspective it is important to investigate what factors are behind the deviations from
PPP reported above. A particularly interesting issue is whether inflation differentiaLs
responded to realorto monetaryshocks.
In his celebrated 1964 article Balassa postulated that there are three fundamental
real reasons for rejecting the relative version of PPP: (a) different rates of
technological progress (or aggregate growth) across countries;7 (b) terms of trade
shocks which affect the equilibrium real exchange rate; and (c) changes in commercial
policy that alter taxes on international transactions. In the case of Guatemala and
Honduras, however, the latter explanation is rather implausible for 1930-83, since
throughout most of this period there were only limited changes in commercial policy.
Another question refers to the possible role of monetary variables in explaining
deviations from PPP. This is particularly important within the context of modern
discussions on the role of fixed exchange rates as a disciplinary device and effective
nominal anchor. It is also relevant to study the ability of the Central Bank to
undertake independent monetary policy, and the possible role of real variables such as
terms of trade shocks and growth differentials in explaining differences in inflation
rates.9 In Section III we investigate the possible roles of both real and monetary
variables in explaining inflation rate differential sin both countries between 1957 and
1983.8
UI. Monetary and Real Shocks, and Inflation Rate Differentials Under Fixed
Nominal Excban2e Rates
IIL1 Fixed Exchange Rates and Credibility
Most modern discussions on PPP and inflation rate differentials under fixed
exchange rates have been couched within the context of credibility and time consistency
literature.'° According to this approach governments that have the discretion to alter
the nominal exchange rate will tend to abuse their power, introducing aninflationary
bias into the economy (Calvo 1978, and Kydland and Prescott 1977). Thereason for
this is that under a set of plausible conditions, such as the existence of labor market
rigidities that preclude the economy from reaching full employment, it will be optimpl
for the government to surprise" the private sector throughunexpected devaluations
that, the government hopes, will reduce real wages and hike employment."In
equilibrium the public will be aware of this incentive fuced by the authorities, and will
react to it by anticipating the devaluation surprises and hence rendering them
ineffective. As a result the economy will reach a high inflationplateau. A key feature
of the credibility literature is that under most circumstancespolicy commitment is
welfare-superior to discretionary policy. If the government can credibly commit itself
to low (or no) inflation, society will be better off: employment will be thesame as in
the discretionary policy case, but inflation will be lower. Theproblem, however, is
that governments have a hard time making credible commitments. In the absence of
effective constraints to tie the government's hands,any promise of low inflationary
policy will not be credible and, thus, will be self-defeating.
The fundamental policy implication of this literature is thatdefining (and
implementing) constraints that will make government pre-commitments credible, will
result in an improvement in society's we1ire. It has beenargued that the adoption of9
afixed exchange rate will constrain governments ability to surprise the private sector
through unexpected devaluations. Promises of fiscal discipline will become credible
and private sector actions will not elicit successive rounds of inflationary actions.'2
In particular, it has been argued that fixed exchange rates provide a reputational
constraint on government behavior. The authorities hiow that if they undertake overly
expansive credit policy they will be forced to abandon the parity and devalue. As the
recent crisis of the ERM has shown, exchange rate crises can indeed shatter the
reputation of politicians.'3
Devarjari and Rodrik (1992) and Kamin (1991), among others, have addressed
the question of the desirability of fixed exchange rates from a more general
perspective.'4 For example, in Devarajan and Radrik (1992), policy makers face a
tradeoff regarding exchange rate policy: while exchange rate flexibility has an
inflationary bias, it also allows the country to reduce output variability. This is
accomplished by smoothing, via exchange rate adjustments, the consequences of terms
of trade shocks on output. In this model it is not possible to rank a-priori fixed and
flexible (or active) exchange rate regimes. For large terms of trade shocks it is more
likely that flexible exchange rates will be superior. Likewise, the more vulnerable the
real economy is to these terms of trade shocks, the more desirable will flexible
arrangements become. On the other hand, the greater is the government's built-in
inflationary bias, the greater will be its temptation to abuse devaluations, and the less
desirable will a flexible arrangement become.
John Williamson (1991) has argued that a fixed exchange rate would be
advisable as long as four conditions are met: (1) the country in question is "small"
relative to the rest of the world; (2) the bulk of its international trade is undertaken
with the country (or countries) with respect to which it plans to peg its currency; (3)10
the country shes to have a rate of inflation similar to that of the country it is pegging
its currency to; and (4) there are institutional arrangements that assure that the
commitment to a fixed rate is credible. Williamson goes on toargue that, once these
four conditions are met, the only remaining argument in favor of flexible exchange
rates refers to terms of trade shocks.
Historically, Guatemala and Honduras have satisfied Williamson's first three
conditions. Whether the fourth requirement —theexistence of appropriate institutional
arrangements —wasfulfilled may be subject to some discussion. In both countries the
Central Bank lacked formal independence, and the professional staffs werevery small.
Also, budgetary procedures for the public sector were primitive and lacked
transparency. On the other hand, however, the most important institutional support for
maintaining a fixed exchange rate was the very long history with this type of regime.
As time passed, this remarkable history became a greater andgreater reputational
constraint, making the notion of devaluation unthinkih1e.
With respect to terms of trade, every Central Americancountry -including
Guatemala and Honduras —experiencedincreased volatility in the 1970s (see figure 2
for the Honduran case). This suggests that at some time, and dueto changes in the
nature of underlying shocks, an exchange rate regime that had beenappropriate ceased
to be so. Guatemala and Honduras, however, decided to maintain their ftxedrates in
spite of increasingly large external fluctuations. However, another Central American
country, Costa Rica, opted for abandoning the fixed exchange rate in order to achieve
a smoother external sector adjustment —evenat the cost of higher inflation.
Preliminary evidence discussed in Edwards (1994) suggests that, by allowing anearly
exchange rate realignment Costa Rica was able to achieve a significantly faster




































































































































































































































































































Within the credibility framework discussed above it is important to understand
whether, under a fixed nominal exchange rate regime, countries are able to undertake
independent monetary policy. Stockmaa (1992) has analyzed the issue of monetary
autonomy for a group of industrial countries during the Breton Woods era. He
estimated a series of vector autoregressions for inflationary differentials, and tested
whether the coefficients of money growth (as a group) were significantly different to
zero. He found that for the majority of the countries the null hypothesis of zero
money growth coefficients was rejected, and interpreted these results as evidence in
favor of the hypothesis that industrial countries had sonic room to undertake
independent monetary policy during the Bretton Woods era.
In a (small) open economy subject to exogenous shocks, Central Banks
sometimes try to use monetary (or credit) policy in an attempt to counter the effects of
terms of trade disturbances. Under these circumstances, domestic credit would be
expanded when the terms of trade worsen, and contracted when the terms of trade
improve. Naturally, under fixed exchange rates, the magnitude of credit expansion
will be restricted by the availability of international reserves and the country's capacity
to borrow internationally. Of course, a serious problem with this type of
countercydical domestic credit policy is that it requires that the authorities have a good
notion of whether terms of trade shocks are temporary or permanent.
In order to deal with these issues we estimated equations of the following type
using quarterly data for the four Latin countries in the sample:
+u (2)12
where, as before, Dinrefersto inflationary differentials; Gmo; is the rate of
growth of narrowly defined money for the country in question; dtot is the percentage
change in the country's terms of trade; Grodif is the differential in the rate of growth
of GDP between the country and the U.S., which along the lines of the empirical PPP
literature, is used as a proxy for differences in technological progress across countries;
u is an error term; andi =l,...,3;and j= O,...3.'If these countries enjoyed —
andpracticed —monetaryindependence, we would expect that the coefficients of
Gmon would be different from zero as a group. Terms of trade shocks and growth
differentials are the real variables in this analysis. The role of external disturbances in
the inflationary process is captured by the sum of the dtot coefficients. In order to
look at this issue from different angles, we also estimated a series of equations of the
type of (2), where we replaced Gmon for the rate of growth of domestic credit
(Gcredit).16 Table 4 presents the likelihood ratio tests obtained from testing the
hypotheses that: (a) the coefficients of Gmon —orthose of Gcredit —werejointly
zero; (b) the coefficients of dtot were jointly zero; and (c) that the coefficients of
Grodif were jointly zero. As can be seen, the null hypothesis that the money growth
coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be rejected at conventional levels in both
countries. In the case of Gcredit the results are different; it is not possible to reject
the null hypothesis in either country. Table 4 also shows that in only one regression —
Guatemaiawhen Gcredit is the monetary variable —ispossible to reject the hypothesis
that the terms of trade coefficients are jointly zero. With respect to the growth
differential terms, the null hypothesis was rejected in all regressions at conventional
levels.
The results reported above are somewhat mixed. Although they suggest that
central banks were able, at least in the short run, to engage in independent monetaryTable 4
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF MONETARY, TERMS OF TRADE AND GROWTH
DIFFERENTIAL VARIABLES
GUATEMALA hONDURAS
PERIOD 58.2 -83.4 63.2- 83.4
Rate of Growth 9.144 13.739
of Money (0.058) (0.008)
Rate of Growth 1.382 6.900
of Domestic Credit (0.847) (0.141)
Percent Change
in Terms of Trade
a) With Money as 6.975 5.551
Explanatory Variable (0.137) (0.235)
b) With Domestic Credit as 11.876 3.343
Explanatory Variable (0.018) (0.502)
Growth Differentials
a) With Money as 2.743 6.310
Explanatory Variable (0.602) (0.177)
b) With Domestic Credit as 1.923 5.106
Explanatory Variable (0.750) (0.277)
(a) Numbers in parentheses are levels of significance.13
policy,the evidence in this regard is not overwhelming. In particular, it is somewhat
surprising thatthe coefficientsof Gcredit did not turn out to be significant as a group.
As a way to further explore this issue wereestimatedtheDinfequations, reducing the
dimension of the vector auto regression. In the new estimates both terms of trade
shocks and growth differentials were excluded from the analysis. Table 5 contains the
likelihood ratio tests on the significance of Gmon and Gcredit for both countries. As
can be seen in this case the null hypothesis that the monetary variables coefficients are
jointly zero is rejected in both regressions. All in all, we inteipret the evidence
reported in this section as providing some evidence supporting the view that the
monetary authorities in these countries were able to engage in independent monetary
policy during the period. And yet, the fact that the fixed exchange rate regime was
maintained throughout indicates quite clearly that this ability was not abused by the
authorities. The next section deals with the issue of monetary policy and the
abandonment of the exchange rate regime in some detail.
IV. Credit Policy and Exchan2e Rate Crises
In the mid and late 1980s and early 1990s the long experience with fixed
nominal exchange rates came to an end in both of our countries. Guatemaia devalued
in 1986, and Honduras abandoned its official parity in early 1990. These devaluations,
however, were not easy to undertake, Even when the evidence overwhelmingly
showed that the old regime was not sustainable any longer, the authorities in both
countries desperately adhered to the fixed rate, and imposed severe exchange and
capital controls in an effort to avoid the complete depletion of international reserves.
As a result of this, significant black markets for foreign exchange were developed —




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fiscal and monetary policy variables, and we investigate the circumstances that led to
the abandonment of the fixed parities in the 1980s.
The fundamental feature of a fixed exchange rate system is that it imposes
financial discipline on the Central Bank and other government agencies. The
authorities are aware that if they systematically violate certain macroeconomic
constraints the country will deplete its international reserves to a minimumlevel,and
will be forced to give up the parity. Consequently, a fixed exchange rate imposes
upper bounds to domestic credit creation and fiscal imbalances. These constraints,
however, operate in the medium to long rnn, and do not have to be observed at every
moment. it is, in fact, perfectly possible that in a particular period credit creation
exceeds this threshold". However, when this happens, the authorities will rapidly try
to change directions, bringing macro policy back to a consistent course.'7
If the country can increase its foreign indebtedness, the macro constraints can
be side stepped for a longer period of time. This, however, cannot be a permanent
solution. As the Latin countries found out the hard way in the early 1980s, at some
point the international community will stop providing funds, and a crisis will erupt.
Fixed rates impose two basic financial constraints: first, domestic credit cannot
grow, on average, at a rate faster than that of the demand for money. This, in turn, is
determined by world inflation, real income growth and the income elasticity of the
demand for money.'1 Second, the fiscal deficit (as a proportion of GDP) financed by
money creation cannot exceed a certain bound determined by the increase in the
demand for money and the degree of monetization of the economy."
Figures 4 and 5 display estimated annual upper bounds or thresholds as well as
actual rates of domestic credit creation and the fiscal deficit for our two countries.20
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linesare the "upper bounds imposed by the fixed nominal exchange rates regime.
These figures, then, capture the periods during which the bounds were exceeded.
During the early years (up to the mid to 1970s or early 1980s, depending on the
country) the bounds seemed to have been very effective. Every time the actual rate of
credit creation, or the deficit ratio, exceeded their respective thresholds the authorities
rapidly implemented corrective policies bringing the policy variable below the bound.
These data suggest that during these years Guatemala and Honduras followed the "rules
of the games, and acted as if the nominal exchange rate regime imposed a financial
constraints. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, this behavior breaks down;
as the figures show in both countries the two policy indicators exceed the estimated
thresholds without returning, in the short or medium runs, to a level consistent with
fixed exchange rates.
In order to further investigate the behavior of credit policy in the period
preceding the devaluation crisis, we estimated vector autoregressions for domestic
credit growth for the core period under fixed exchange rates, 1957.75.21Wethen
compared forecasted values obtained from these equations with actual credit growth.
As Table 6 shows, in both Guatemala and Honduras the forecasted rate of growth of
domestic credit was below the actual growth between 1977 and 1981. This suggests
that if the authorities had maintained the historical policy behavior in the period
preceding the debt crisis, the rate of credit expansion would have been significantly
below what was observed. This departure from the policies that respected the nominal
anchor constraint created the increasingly large inflation rate differential reported
above, and eventually led to the collapse of the fixed rate regime.Table 6
ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED RATES OF GROWTH
OF DOMESTIC CREDIT (a)
PERIOD ACTUAL GROWTH OF FORECASTED GROWTH















(a) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.16
V. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate some aspects of Latin
America's experience with fixed exchange rates at the light of Bela Balassa's
contributions to the purchasing power parity theory. The analysis has dealt with both
long term characteristics of this system in Latin America. We evaluated the long-term
experiences of two Latin American nations with fixed exchange rates. The evidence
analyzed suggests that the relative version of PPP did not hold in Guatema1i and
Honduras. However, in spite of the fact that these countries had the ability to conduct
independent monetary policy, the existence of a long tradition of exchange rate
stability provided some constraints on Central Bank behavior. This evidence,
however, also indicates that these constraints were limited, and would not survive the
combination of populist political pressures and severely negative terms of trade shocks
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, our analysis suggests that in the mid 1970s
domestic credit and fiscal policies undertook a significant change, and were not any
longer constrained by the existence of a fixed nominal exchange rate.17
Aopendix -CentralAmerican Experiences with Fixed Exchange Rates: A Brief
History
GUATEMALA
Early in 1919 Princeton professor and economic advisor Edwin Kemmerer was
hired by the Guatemaian government to prepare a proposal for monetary reform. The
fall of dictator Estraxia Cabrera a year later prevented Kemrnerer's Gold Standard
proposal to be adopted. In September 1923 the Caja Reguladora was established to
stabilize exchange rate with funds earmarked from taxes on coffee and stop the fall in
the value of the peso. Kemmerer was invited again in 1924, and a currency reform
initiated. The Quetzal was established as the new monetary unit, to be issued at par
with the dollar.
The first Central Bank of Guatemala was founded in 1925 with very little
foreign technical assistance. It was a semi-public institution, whose department of
currency issue only discounted short run trade bills. Besides, this bank also operated
as a commercial institution. It was managed by a JuntaDirectivacomposed by 9
members, 2 chosen by the government and 7 by the stockholders.
In 1926 the Guatemalan authorities were finally persuaded by Kemmerer's early
proposal, and the country embraced the Gold Standard. The Caja Reguladora waS
reorganized as the Banco Central de Guatemala, with monopoly of note issue. The
exchangeratewasfixedat60pescsperQuetzalordollar(thepesohadbeenatpar
with the dollar in 1870.) The new currency was linked at par with the U.S. dollar,
starting a tradition of more than half a century of fixed parities. It was a fully
transferable paper currency, covered by 50 percent in gold and 30 percent in dollar
assets. In February 1934 the Quetzal was devalued along with the dollar, and the
official gold price increased to 35 Quetzales per ounce.18
In December 1945 the Bancod€Guatemalareplacedthe old central bank
Several economists from the Federal Reserve System (Robert Triffin and Henry
Wallich among others) were part of the reorganization task force. The new Junta
Monetaria was composed by six members, four representatives from the public sector,
one from the University of San Carlos de Guatemala and one from the private financial
sector, arid was in charge of designing and implementing monetary, credit and
exchange rate policies of Guatemala. In December 1946 Guatem joined the IMP
and the World Bank, as part of the so-called "dollar area." In March 1956 Guatemala
became a member of the International Finance Corporation.
CoL Arbenz Guzman caine to power on March 1951, and then several
collectivist experiments were implemented, as for instance the natior2B7tion of real
estate holdings of foreign companies. As a result, a black market for U.S. banknotes
emerged, and the premium reached 25 percent. In 1954, after a coup d'etat led by
Col. Castillo Armas, black markets finally disappear.
By 1962 a new era of political unrest had begun, and the black market
exchange rate peaked at 1.5 per dollar. A multiple exchange rate system was
established on October 1962, and exchange controls were enacted for the first time in
Guatemalan history. After the implementation of an economic austerity plan, the
multiple exchange rate system was abolished in May 1963, and the parity was once
again unified at one Quetzal per dollar.
Exchange controls were slowly enacted starting in 1980, as a consequence of
the state of beliigerance in Central America. The outburst of civil war in 1981 led to
the breakdown of the CACM and growing protectionism. Besides, an excessively
expansionary fiscal policy gave rise to a process of real exchange rate overvaluation
and loss of international reserves. During the first half of the 1980s, the black market19
premium increased constantly, peaking at more than 250 percent in 1985. A three-tier
exchange rate system was created in November 1984. The official rate of one Quetzal
per dollar was maintained for most export receipts, proceeds from foreign borrowing,
and for the service of the external public debt. An auction market rate ruled cerlain
import payments, and a fluctuating bank rate was effective for all other dealings.
There were also mixed export rate for sugar, cotton and meat from outside the Central
American Common Market (80 percent official and 20 percent fluctuating.) A partial
devaluation was undertaken in February 1985, by shifting commodities to the
fluctuating exchange rate. A tax of 3.5 percent on foreign exchange operations was
establishedin July 1985, and the mixed export rate was finaly devalued in October of
the same year. The exchange rate system was simplified in June 1986. The official
rate was set at one Quetzal per dollar for previously contracted foreign debt; the
fluctuating rate became the interbank rate at 2.9 for remittances and tourism, and the
auction market rate was replaced with the regulated market rate at 2.5 for imports and
exports, while all foreign exchange taxes were eliminated. Finally, the exchange
market was unified in June 1988.
HONDURAS
In the early 1900 Honduras split in two parts for currency purposes: the dollar
was means of payments and unit of account in the northern coast (banana production
areas) while silver currency ruled in the rest of the country. In May 1918 the
government authorized a private commercial bank (Banco Atlantida) to redeem notes in
dollars. The US currency was declared legal tender, and the official exchange rate
fixed at two pesos per dollar. The new currency was linked to gold at the rate of20
0.836 grams per unit. In 1919 the Banco Atlantida was obliged to keep reserves in
gold or dollars.
In 1921, Arthur Young, a US currency expert, presented a plan for monetary
reform based on the Gold Standard to the Congress, which was not acted on. Gold
and silver circulated side by side during the 1920s, until the Lempira was introduced
as new currency in 1931. Its parity was 2 to 1 relative to the U.S. dollar. The
Lempira was devalued along with the dollar in February 1934, while the gold content
of the Lempira was reduced to 0.444 grams, marking the end of the Gold Standard in
Honduras.
Prior to February 1950, Honduras had only two banks -Banco de Honduras
andBanco1dtlbuida, bothprivate. In that year, the BancoCeniTa! de Honduras was
established with the technical support of the IMF. As in the case of Guatemala, a
JwUa Monetaria, with representatives from the government, official development
agencies, commercial banks, and primary productive sectors, was responsible for the
monetary policy of the country. On September 1955 the new banking law was
approved, setting the regulatory framework for the establishment of financial
institutions.
The Lempira maintained its link with the dollar after August 1971, which
entailed a de facto devaluation. The gold content of Lempira was reduced 7.89 percent
the following December, and again, on February 1973 by another 10 percent.
In the beginning of the 1980s overly expansive fiscal policies gave rise to a
large disequilibrium in the external sector, because of the incipient overvaluation trend
in the real exchange rate. With the intensications of social tensions there was an
increase in capital flight, until 1980 when capital controls were imposed. Moreover,
starting in 1982 a large series of trade barriers were established as a reaction of the21
lack of foreign funds to finance the external sector deficit. A parallel market rate for
commercial transactions with Central American countries was established in March
1985,followedby a program of subsidies to non-traditional exports in December 1987,
which in practice meant a highly distortive system of multiple exchange rates.
Meanwhile, the parallel market premium increased from 20 percent in 1986 to 80
percent in 1989, signalling a growing imbalance in the external sector. Finally, a
period of more than 70 years of fixed parities caine to an end in March 1990, when the
Lempira was devalued.22
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Endnotes
1. Viner (1937) gives a flavor of the debate.
2. Strictly speaking Balassa's theorem also requires that the share of
tradables in the price index is the same across countries.
3. See, in particular, Balassa (1962, 1964).
4. We have been unable to find a complete time series of Honduran and
Guatemalan prices for the period prior to 1990.
5. A number of authors have (correctly) argued that, in general, world
inflation should be measured using a basket of foreign infl2tion. In the case
of Central America, however, the overwhelming majority of trade is with the
U.S. This justifies using U.S. inflation as a proxy. Notice that the
estimation of (1) using conventional techniques assumes that inflation is
stationary. This is discussed in greater detail in the section that follows.
6. Edwards (1994) also looks at the experiences of El Salvador and the
Dominican Republic.
7. For a detailed discussion of alternative tests of PPP see Officer (1986).
Svensson (1993), for example, refers to the Balassa effect as dealing with
growthdifferentials.
8. All of these are what have become to be known as real exchange rate
fundamentals. See Edwards (1989).
9.This discussion is somewhat related to traditional debates on sterilization
and the "offset" coefficient. See Obstfeld (1982).
10.The new impetus for fixed rates has strongly emerged in the International
Monetary Fund. See Aghevli et al. (1991).
11 .This assumes that wages are set before the government implements the
exchange rate policy, but after it has been announced.
12.Aghevli et al. (1991).
13. In spite of its elegant appeal, this view has, in its simplest incarnation,
some serious limitations. First, in these simple settings exchange rate policy
has a very restricted role. In fact, in most of these models its only effect is
to alter the domestic rate of inflation and, through it, the government
perceives it as altering real wages. However, in most modern exchange rate
models, nominal devaluations can also help accommodate shocks to real
exchange rate fundamentals -includingshocks to the terms of trade -
helpingto avoid RER misalignment. Second, in economies with stochastic
shocks, contingent exchange rate rules can, at least in principle, be superior
to fixed rates (Flood and Isard 1988). Third, it is not clear why a country26
that can credibly commit itself to unilaterally fixing the exchange rate, cannot
commit itself to maintaining a fixed stock of domestic money, or to follow a
specific monetary rule.
14. Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) had earlier addressed the same
problem in the context of optimal currency areas. See also Corden (1972).
15.The data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics. The
monetary data were centered" in order to make them compatible with the
inflation figures, which refer to period averages.
16. Since Gmon may not be completely exogenous, using Gcredit helps deal
the endogeneity issue. The problem of potential exogeneity was also tackled
by computing variance decompositions for a series of estimated VARs. In all
cases, and under all possible orderings of the variables, the results provide
strong indications that Gmon was, at least up to 6 quarters, exogenous.
17.That is, under fixed exchange rate constraints it is assumed that macro
authorities follow the rules of the gamew.
18.This assumes several things: first, the initial ratio of domestic credit to
money is equal to the desired ratio. This is equivalent to saying that initially
the Central Bank holds the desired ratio of reserves. Second, it assumes that
the opportunity cost of holding money does not vary excessively, and can be
ignored. Third, it assumes that the external debt/GDP ratio is in
equilibrium.
19.Formally this constraint is derived from the public finance approach to
inflation. The deficit to GDP ratio (d) cannot exceed the rate of growth of
money demand (dM/M) times the initial ratio of money to GDP.
20.In order to compute the upper bounds it was necessary to first obtain data
on the long run income elasticity of the demand for money. We estimated
demand for money equations for each country independently, using annual
data for 1950-80. In the case of Guatemala the estimated value was 1.1; for
Honduras was 1.8.
21. In addition to lagged values of domestic credit growth, we used U.S.
inflation and real GDP growth in the country in question. Three lags of each
variable were included.